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A Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
By 
Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn
“Change does not necessarily assure progress, but progress implacably requires change. 
Education is essential to change, for education creates both new wants and the ability to 
satisfy them.”   
- Henry Steele Commager  
Acquisition Research Mission 
Fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world is again experiencing a major 
shift in the geopolitical landscape. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
Cold War have profoundly changed the nation’s security environment.  However, as the 
September 11th attacks demonstrated, new deadly challenges have emerged from terrorist 
networks and rogue states.   Although none of these threats equal the destructive 
capabilities of the Soviet Union, their determination to obtain, and the greater likelihood 
that they will use, weapons of mass destruction, creates a more complex and dangerous 
security environment.   
The Department of Defense (DoD) has also entered a transformative period—
leveraging emerging technologies to develop a net-centric warfare capability1—while
actively conducting military operations, throughout the spectrum of conflict, in support of 
1Adapting itself to fight warfare in the Information Age and preparing forces that use 
information superiority as a key weapon.
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the global war on terror.  As a result, DoD is struggling to meet these competing 
requirements and reconcile the spending between traditional and new programs. 
Therefore, creating a more efficient acquisition system is a top priority.  High-quality 
research in the area of acquisitions is necessary to catalyze positive and lasting changes to 
improve performance, reduce acquisition cycle times, and reduce the costs of DoD 
acquisitions, even as the Department confronts rapidly changing external and internal 
environments. This report highlights some the forces that are acting to change the 
environment including: budget constraints, a changing threat environment, technological 
innovations, force transformation, human capital management, a shrinking industrial 
base, and ethics; and then develops a strategy for acquisition research. 
Allocating a minute percentage of the over $250 billion annual defense acquisition 
budget to original, rigorous, and replicable acquisition research could have an 
immeasurable impact on the Department.  Such an investment could provide 
improvements in both qualitative and quantitative measures, while better equipping 
forces to effectively respond to the changing economic, technological, geo-political, and 
threat environments in a faster and more cost-effective fashion.  
Background
Nearly two-thirds of the total Defense budget is used for acquisitions that include: 
funds for operations and maintenance of field equipment to ensure force readiness 
(approx. $121 billion); procurement of major weapons systems or equipment such as 
aircrafts and tactical vehicles (approx. $77 billion); and research, development, test and 
evaluation of proposed and early stage weapons systems and development of support 
technology (approx. $70 billion) (Report of the Committee on Appropriations   June 18, 
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2004).  Given the importance of acquisitions, Congress, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, and other experts have voiced concern that acquisition programs 
and projects too often exceed schedule and budget estimates. Many also point out that the 
process is too cumbersome to adequately meet rapidly changing priorities and 
circumstances.  
Efforts to reform DoD’s acquisition processes are not a new concept. As far back as 
the Revolutionary War, critics have referred to national defense acquisition practices as 
primitive, hobbled by complex rules, and plagued by cost and schedule overruns. Figure 
1 illustrates multiple reform initiatives attempted during the past half century. Prior to 
1990, the majority of acquisition reform attempts were proposed in response to isolated 
criminal incidents, public outcry of perceived wasteful purchases, or major weapons 
systems cost overruns, and could best be characterized as primarily applying constraints 
on the acquisition workforce’s decision making ability (Cooper 2002).  Most of these 
early reform attempts were stymied by cultural resistance or ineffective implementation.  
Such ineffective and misfocused reforms send the wrong message to the workforce and 
have the potential to reduce interest in or acceptance of future reform initiatives.  
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Key Acquisition Studies and Reform Initiatives
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
McNamara Initiatives (1961)
Fitzhugh Commission (1970)
Commission on Government Procurement (1972)
Office of Management and Budget Circular A - 109 (1976)
Defense Science Board Acquisition Cycle Study (1978)
Defense Resource Management Study (1979)
Defense Acquisition Improvement Program (1981)
Grace Commission (1983)
Packard Commission (1986)
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (1986)
Defense Management Review (1989)










Source: Adapted from GAO/NSIAD-93-15 “Weapons Acquisition: A Rare Opportunity for Lasting 
Change”, December 1992. 
Figure 1.  Acquisition Studies and Reform Initiatives 1960 - 1998 
Modern acquisition reform attempts, beginning during the 1990s, echo findings from 
earlier panels that for 40 years have called for establishing flexible acquisition strategies, 
developing subsystems incrementally, establishing multiple decision points during 
program development, and improving professional development of acquisition personnel 
(Reeves 1996).  However, the impetus for current reform has changed.  Recent 
acquisition reform initiatives have attempted to realign acquisition practices with current 
technological and commercial realities. The potential for lasting reform may be greater if 
leaders can effectively communicate that these reforms are needed in response to the 
rapidly changing environment where flexibility and accountability in decision making are 
necessities.
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In 1994, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA, P.L. 103-355) was signed 
into law. This law revised over 225 statutory requirements and condensed hundreds of 
laws into a unified procurement code. Key provisions of FASA included: (1) raising the 
threshold to $100,000 for the waiving of many statutes governing defense procurement; 
(2) streamlining the bid-protest process to prevent costly delays that could result when 
contractors protest procurement contract awards; (3) increasing to $500,000 the cap that 
would allow bidding defense contractors to bypass specialized accounting system 
requirements and avoid providing the government lengthy cost and pricing data (thus 
encouraging commercial suppliers to bid on defense business); (4) raising to $100,000 
the value of contracts that could be reserved for small businesses; and (5) creating unified 
federal procurement statutes for executive branch agencies (Grasso 2002).   
Smart reforms can have a dramatic effect.  For example, increasing the small 
purchase threshold to $100,000 allows DoD to “use simplified procedures for 99 percent 
of our contract actions, which … account for only 16 percent of our dollars, freeing up 
our well-trained contracting officers and senior buyers to work on that 1 percent of our 
contracts that encompass 84 percent of our dollars,” according to Colleen Preston, the 
first Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform (Ballenger 1995). FASA 
legislation also recommended pilot programs as a way to advance acquisition reform 
initiatives into a new era. Pilot programs benefit reform efforts by encouraging risk-
taking and allowing the opportunity to take theory to practice on a few systems before 
directing wholesale, systematic change. These pilot programs will also help overcome 
reluctance to change by demonstrating near-term successes (Reeves 1996). 
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A second package of reforms, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996, 
concentrated on the areas of competition, commercial items, and certification 
requirements. These reform provisions sought to simplify procedures to procure 
commercially available products and services. Reducing the emphasis on military-
specific products allows DoD to take advantage of lower cost commercially-available 
goods that meet the needs of the Department and troops. The Act further reduced barriers 
to acquiring commercial products by eliminating the requirement for certified cost and 
pricing data; requirements that many private companies considered too expensive and 
prevented them from seeking out government contracts. 
Although these reforms have introduced significant changes, there is little organized 
effort to research and evaluate their efficacy.  As a result, reforms that are often put in 
place based on intuition and anecdotal evidence continue to influence acquisition 
processes, whether or not they achieve their desired objectives.
Status of Current Research   
A disciplined, basic and applied research program is the only proven way to 
develop new theories and then use them to solve specific, practical questions within a 
knowledge domain—and the evaluate their effectiveness.   
Currently, however, only extremely limited acquisition research is being 
conducted—primarily by internal DoD organizations, such as the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Defense Acquisition University, Air Force Institute of Technology, and DoD 
FFRDCs (e.g. Rand and LMI). Although these research projects offer valuable 
assessments of current practices and suggestions for improvements, the results are often 
limited in scope and may only address one specific problem at a time; often replicate 
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previous or parallel work; and generally have limited general application.  These efforts 
constitute only a fraction of the effort that is warranted by the size, complexity, and 
changing nature of the DoD’s acquisition challenges.  They are not a substitute for 
dedicated, replicable academic research. 
While there are some parallels between defense acquisition and the private sector, 
there are enough differences to suggest a need for dedicated interdisciplinary university 
research that includes, but is not limited to, public policy or political science, business, 
engineering, and computer science. However, virtually no acquisition research is funded 
at leading research universities today.  The Department should strive to provide funding 
to researchers, residing within these traditional research outlets, to address this critical 
imperative.   
Such research would, of course, serve the additional function of developing a 
cadre of both professors and graduate students skilled in the specialized knowledge of 
defense acquisition—an area (because of the lack of such research) considerably lacking 
today.
Some Broad Trends
Many broad trends within the acquisition community may considerably change the 
acquisition environment and require a closer look: 
High, and growing, unit costs, longer product realization cycles, non-state-of-the-
art logistics.  The development of DoD weapon systems routinely costs more to 
buy, takes much longer time to field, and requires more maintenance and logistics 
support than is included in projected budgets.  As a result, the buying power of 
the department is reduced and required warfighting capabilities are delayed, 
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necessitating difficult trade-offs in production rates and total quantities bought.
These decisions can then cause harmful ripples through other programs and 
defense requirements.  The extended development times result in legacy systems 
remaining in the inventory for longer period and also result in systems fielded 
with near obsolete components that require refreshing soon after their initial 
deployment.  These inefficiencies result in greater operations and support cost 
resulting in reduced funding available for modernization.   
Non-state-of-the-art business systems.  In the performance of its warfighting 
mission, DoD performs various business operations.  These include the 
procurement of goods and services, the management of extensive logistic 
functions, management of both civilian and military human capital, management 
of a global healthcare system, as well as the financial management of an over 
$400 billion budget.  Problems with these systems have resulted in the lack of 
reliable information for sound decision making, hampered operational efficiency, 
and have left the department vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse.  DoD has 
recognized that its financial management systems do not provide information that 
is relevant, reliable, and timely, and has initiated a major effort to transform its 
management system.  This effort, which began in 2001 has made little progress to 
date. Developing efficient and effective financial management systems are critical 
to the sound management of department resources.   
Inadequate equipment reliability. DoD’s warfighting mission places a high 
premium on weapon system readiness.  There are two methods to achieve high 
readiness rates.  The first is to develop and deploy highly reliable systems; the 
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second is to maintain a high-level logistics system that can provide spare parts 
and maintenance when they are needed.  As a result, weapon systems with low 
reliability rates put an excessive burden on the logistics system and become very 
expensive to operate.  Although DoD has initiated several efforts to reduce total 
life cycle cost, system developers continue to defer to technical performance 
requirements—trading off the operating and support costs—producing systems 
with poor reliability.
“Management” vs. “procurement”. The very nature of DoD acquisition is 
changing.  Attention is shifting away from the traditional procurement of things to 
the management of contractors that are performing services.  This shift will 
require program managers and procurement officers to have different skill sets, 
and levels of education training and maturity. 
Judgment (with guidance) vs. rules.  The DoD acquisition system is extremely 
complex, and is already a major management challenge.  Whenever a problem or 
“abuse” occurs, the natural tendency is to develop more rules and regulations.  
Making an already complex system more complex, even with the best of 
intentions, will not make the system more effective or help mitigate unanticipated 
problems.  Recruiting and training highly qualified individuals, and then allowing 
them to exercise their judgment, with oversight, in pursuit of the program 
objectives may yield better results.   
Best value vs. low bid. The challenge and new charge is not simply to get cheaper 
services; but to get better services at lower costs. This approach is dramatically 
different than simply going to the “low bidder” who promises to meet “minimal 
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acceptable performance.”  This creates a new and difficult challenge for the 
buying organization: it requires a serious value judgment in comparing potential 
performance and costs for each of the bidders (public or private).  In many cases it 
also means the contract must be a “performance-based contract,” i.e., provides 
broad performance objectives, but does not provide a detailed specification on 
how to achieve it.  Additionally, these contracts are more difficult to write, but 
their structure is critical in getting the best value from the contractor.   
Competitive sourcing vs. in-house.  The nature of what the government does is 
changing.  In the past, the government has been the monopoly “doer” of things.  
What is being asked of DoD is essentially what was demanded of US private 
industry in the latter part of the 20th century in order to remain competitive. There 
are many good examples of successful American businesses which have come to 
rely on core competencies to do what they do best.2 DoD can learn from their 
successes to focus on public core competencies, such as policy, fiscal 
management, oversight, and warfighting. For all other activities, the public sector 
must rely more and more on competition to achieve higher performance at the 
lowest cost and to get the “best value” from either the private or the public sector.
The current policy is to allow the private sector to compete against the 
government employees for some of these functions; this has come to be known as 
“competitive sourcing.”  When implementing competitive sourcing, regardless of 
whether the public or private sector win these competitions, market forces are 
introduced that, in the end, improve the performance and lower the cost.  This is 
2 Good examples are FEDEX, Caterpillar, Dell Computers, etc. 
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done using the OMB Circular A76, and other processes, including outsourcing, 
privatization, and public/private partnerships.  The available data tend to show 
that we significantly improve performance (in some cases by orders of 
magnitude) and at the same time, on average, lower the cost by over 30%.
Contractors in the combat zone.  DoD has come to rely on using contractors in 
security operations as a method to achieve more cost effectiveness in the military, 
to compensate for military personnel cuts, to use the technological expertise of 
contractors, and to allow for flexibility from congressional troop limits. These 
contractors provide military forces with a wide variety of services, ranging from 
logistics support (e.g., maintenance, housing, dining facilities) and training, to 
security services.  These contracts are a form of contracting-out for services, yet 
because of the risks involved to individuals and corporations performing the 
services, they have many unique challenges and requirements.
Adapting to a Changing World 
The acquisition needs, sources, strategies and process of the defense acquisition 
community are profoundly affected by the pressures and influences of a changing world.
Budgetary pressures are increasing, and new national security issues have dramatically 
changed the environment in which the DoD operates.  Efforts by the Office of Force 
Transformation, as well as changes in government workforce demographics will 
significantly affect how DoD does its business. A shrinking industrial base and important 
ethics concerns have a profound impact on the defense acquisition community. 
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Budgetary Pressures 
The federal budget deficit is over $400 billion dollars, even when accounting for the 
current Social Security and Postal Service surpluses. The U.S. faces large and growing 
structural deficits largely due to demographic trends and rising health care costs.  
Composition of Spending as a Share of GDP
Assuming Discretionary Spending Grows with GDP after 2005 











Medicare & MedicaidNet Interest
All other spending
Percent of GDP
Notes:  Although expiring tax provisions are extended, revenue as a share of GDP increases through 2015 due to 
(1) real bracket creep, (2) more taxpayers becoming subject to the AMT, and (3) increased revenue from tax-
deferred retirement accounts.  After 2015, revenue as a share of GDP is held constant. 
Source:  GAO’s March 2005 analysis.
Figure 2. Potential Expansion of Government Deficit  
Closing the current long-term fiscal gap based on responsible assumptions would 
require real average annual economic growth in the double digit range every year for the 
next 75 years. During the economic boom of the 1990s, the economy only grew at an 
average 3.2 percent per year. As a result, we cannot simply grow our way out of this 
problem. Following the status quo is not an option and tough choices will be required 
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(Walker 2005). Government agencies, including DoD, are likely to faced amplified 
budgetary pressures in the future.
The 2005 Defense Appropriations Bill totaled $401.7 billion in new budget authority 
for DoD, a 35 percent increase from 2001, but fell short of President Bush’s request by 
over $1.5 billion (Report of the Committee on Appropriations, June 18, 2004; OMB 
2004). Faced with multiple pressures including the demands of the war on terrorism, 
persistent budgetary deficits, and the need to protect Medicare and Social Security as the 
baby-boom generation retires, DoD cannot rely solely on budget increases to fund 
transformation. Lasting transformation of our nation’s security posture will depend on the 
acquisition community working together to promote changes and cost savings within the 
Department, and throughout its supporting industrial structure,  through cost cutting 
measures, leveraging civilian technologies, and implementing more efficient methods of 
production.
Commercial buying practices and purchasing supplies available to the general public 
have helped save money and lower overall acquisition costs. In recent years, the Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) has purchased high-quality commercial items (instead of 
military-standard items), which  resulted in savings of more than 20 percent in medical 
supplies and 22 percent in clothing and textiles (based on a sample of more than $190 
million worth of items)  (National Defense Staff 1999).  DoD can encourage additional 
acquisition reforms by funding a comprehensive research project challenging scholars, 
contractors, and military and civilian officials to find innovative ways to lower costs. 
Research should also encourage the evaluation of programs that help usher in fresh ways 
of thinking about acquisitions. Even if savings from a comprehensive research agenda 
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result in a conservative estimate of only one percent of DoD’s annual acquisitions budget, 
this translates into cost savings of over $2.7 billion (($400B * 2/3) *.01), suggesting that 
the potential benefits from a Department funded research agenda far outweigh the small 
costs of research and implementation.   
Changing Environment 
Today’s national security environment is characterized by a great deal of uncertainty.  
The trend to globalization is an overwhelming force that has enabled new security 
challenges as terrorists, traffickers in illegal goods, and alien smugglers make use of the 
world’s financial, communication, and transportation systems (Jacoby 2004). At the same 
time, the US continues to face states with traditional military forces and advanced 
systems, which can include cruise and ballistic missiles, that pose potential threats to 
national interests.  To defeat this volatile mix of challenges will require new strategies, 
force structures, and technologies, should deterrence fail.
The potential for surprise comes from multiple fronts, and resources must be devoted 
to ensure broad situational awareness in order to quickly generate the needed intelligence 
on any security issue as disturbing trends or risks are identified (Jacoby 2004). Uneven 
economic and demographic development remains a source of instability. The poorest 
countries are almost universally those with the fastest growing populations and their 
economics and government services are not expanding fast enough to meet the demands 
of the population. This instability can foster pockets of terrorism and international crime. 
Rogue groups are finding that chemical and biological weapons are easier to develop, 
hide, and deploy than nuclear munitions. The supporting technologies are readily 
available and relatively inexpensive because they have legitimate roles in medical and 
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pharmaceutical industries (Jacoby 2004). Under the changing threat environment, 
weapons of mass destruction, including biological, chemical, and radiological threats, are 
“no longer the sole province of nation-states”(Tenet 2004).
The U.S. military has begun to focus on creating smaller, more adaptable fighting 
forces and creating stronger links with allied forces. These joint forces are taking on a 
greater role in promoting stability and reconstruction in areas of strife as seen in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
DoD leaders recognize that the evolution of military action will be strongly 
influenced by the proliferation of information technologies, as well as the increasing pace 
of technological change.  The legacy acquisition system, with decade long production 
cycles, will not keep pace with the changing threats or technological changes (available 
to potential adversaries), which demand improved performance, lower cost, and shorter 
cycle times.  Some of the specific challenges that add to the uncertainty in the threat 
environment include the following: 
Asymmetric warfare.  Asymmetric warfare is a military concept describing 
conflicts in which the opponents have disparate military capabilities or tactics. In 
such situations, the militarily disadvantaged power must identify and employ its 
special advantages or effectively exploit its enemy's particular weaknesses if they 
are to have any hope of winning.  Since the US has overwhelming conventional 
military power, adversaries will avoid direct force-on-force confrontations, and 
increasingly seek to employ asymmetric capabilities.  State and non-state actors, 
that include terrorist networks and international criminal organizations, increasingly turn 
to asymmetric techniques to challenge the US.   Such adversaries often attempt to 
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target civilian populations, economic centers and symbolic locations as a way to 
attack US political will and resolve.  US forces will need to be flexible and 
adaptive, using rapid prototyping and concept development to adapt to changing 
adversary initiatives.
Weapons proliferation.  Proliferation of advanced technologies and weapons will 
impact the nature of future conflicts.  Many dual use technologies, such as global 
positioning systems, high resolution satellite imagery, and information 
technologies, are inexpensive and widely available commercially.  These can be 
used to help plan and attack targets, both overseas and within the US.  
Information technologies also enable attacks on networks with impunity, carried 
out from safe havens overseas.  Adversaries also have access to advanced weapon 
systems such as weapons of mass destruction and mobile surface-to-surface
missile systems, that dramatically increase their capability to threaten US 
interests.   This proliferation of weapons and technology has significant 
implications for military capabilities.   
Short Technological Cycles.  The commercial world is rapidly developing new, 
and improved, technologies—particularly in the critically-important information 
and communication fields—where new systems appear in 18 month cycles and 
are available on a worldwide basis.  If the DoD continues to have cycles for 
development and deployment of decades, it is clear that the U.S. military will be 
disadvantaged.
Net-centric Warfare.  Net-centric Warfare is the military concept of harnessing 
information technologies to provide commanders and combatants at every level 
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an unprecedented view of the battlefield.  However, it is more than just 
incorporating the latest information technologies; it also addresses how missions 
are accomplished, how units are organized, how they relate to one another, and 
how they are efficiently and effectively supported.  The concept is to shift from a 
platform-centric orientation to a net-centric orientation where all the military 
forces are networked.  The simple but powerful idea is that shared information is 
a source of great military value.  As the number of military users are added to the 
network, the value of the network increases dramatically.  Networked weapons 
platforms, for example, may not need to have their own organic sensors, but 
would be able to take advantage of networked sensors. 
Threats to the Homeland.  The United States, from a national security perspective, 
is blessed with wonderful geography, and for much of its history there was little 
fear of being attacked at home.  There was a 40-year period during the Cold War 
when there were Soviet bombers and ICBMs poised to attack US cites, but with 
the demise of the Soviet Union, the strategic arms reduction talks, and warming of 
relations with Russia, those threats diminished.  However, the US now faces a 
range of adversaries that threaten the United States throughout a complex 
battlespace—it extends from critical regions overseas, spans international 
airspace, waters, space, cyberspace, and includes the homeland.  In addition to 
increased rogue state military capabilities, recent terrorist threats and attacks have 
reminded us of our significant physical vulnerability to an adversary willing to 
employ unconventional tactics.   
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Stability and Reconstruction.   Current military capabilities allow US forces to use 
precision strike techniques that minimize collateral damage and, as demonstrated 
in Iraq, can conclude operations quickly.  Although these precision techniques can 
leave large segments of the population unaffected, they can also leave large 
elements of the adversary’s military undamaged.  US forces may be called upon 
to operate and coordinate interagency reconstruction activities among a largely 
non-combatant population, with pockets of active enemy resistance in place.   
Force Transformation 
Changing threat environments, and the increasing use of unconventional methods of 
attack, require a change in the organization and capabilities of U.S. troops and our allies. 
The Office of Force Transformation within the Department of Defense has begun to 
explore and address issues of transformation of U.S. military capabilities ranging from 
instituting metrics to changing the culture of institutions, to creating new military 
capabilities (Cebrowski 2004).  In April 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
issued a Transformation Planning Guide identifying the critical elements of 
transformation, assigning roles and responsibilities for promoting transformation, and 
depicting the desired outcome of “fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed forces 
capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the battlespace” (DoD 
2003).
This concept of leveraging information, as well as shared situational awareness and 
knowledge, to achieve situational dominance is called Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
(DoD 2001). Transformation depends on enhancements to the physical and information 
domains to create a responsive system with improved performance and the ability to 
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quickly move troops and equipment to crisis areas, while keeping in close 
communication with joint forces in disperse locations. Limited resources may require 
making the decision to forego currently planned systems and invest in capabilities to help 
reduce future risks instead. Acceptance from top leaders is a necessary condition for 
significant transformation, especially when they are asked to cut existing programs. DoD 
must make a concerted effort to educate leaders across the department as to why 
transformation from an industrial age to an information age military is critical to 
maintaining and strengthening U.S. military advantages (DoD 2003).   
What is the impact of these changes on the acquisition community?  The legacy DoD 
acquisition system, and structure of procurement and program offices, have been centered 
on platforms—ships, aircraft, tanks, etc.  The new concepts that support transformation 
will require integration of these systems into “systems of systems.”  This challenge will 
require new and innovative approaches from the acquisition community to develop and 
refine management practices to acquire these integrated programs. 
Government Workforce Demographics 
The Department of Defense is facing a substantial human resources dilemma. Civilian 
employment has decreased by 36 percent—a reduction of over 375,000 employees—
since 1989 (see Figure 3) (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (PR) 2004).  Figure 
4 illustrates how DoD's lack of attention to force shaping during downsizing in the early 
1990s has resulted in a workforce that is not balanced by age or experience.  Such an 
imbalance may put the orderly transfer of institutional knowledge at risk.  
Human capital challenges are even more severe in the acquisitions arena. DoD has 
downsized its acquisition workforce by nearly half, and more than 50 percent of the 
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remaining workforce will be eligible to retire by 2005 (Walker 2003). The Department’s 
ability to effectively create and monitor acquisition programs will be negatively impacted 
unless dramatic steps are taken to ensure the transfer of knowledge about government 
acquisitions and client relationships.  
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Figure 4.  Total DoD Civilian End Strength by Age Band (Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense (PR) 2004) 
Job responsibilities are changing as well and will require new classifications and 
salary systems. The role of the government is shifting from being primarily the 
“provider” of goods and services to the role of being the “manager of the providers” 
(Gansler 2002). The changing world will require more emphasis on civilian education 
and training; today’s ideal job candidates are critical thinkers, management oriented, and 
technologically capable. Acquisition professionals must understand the needs for 
competition and continuous improvement and be able to make sound decisions, even in 
crisis situations. Performance may improve as the department hires highly educated 
employees with technical skills to take the place of retiring baby-boomers. Rather than 
viewing the proportion of acquisition personnel nearing retirement age as a barrier, 
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replacing 25-30 percent of the acquisition workforce should be viewed as a valuable 
opportunity to aggressively recruit fresh thinking, information age personnel ready to 
tackle the acquisition realities of the 21st century (Giffard 2002).
Shrinking Industrial Base 
Shrinking defense budgets in the 1990s resulted in a string of mergers of defense 
industry suppliers. In 1993, there were 21 companies doing major defense aerospace 
work; today there are six U.S. companies: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, 
Raytheon, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman, as shown in Figure 5 (Linster 
2002).
Small and large suppliers alike consider government accounting and reporting 
requirements burdensome and many have stopped bidding on government contracts, 
thereby reducing the stream of suppliers. The lack of qualified vendors became painfully 
obvious when, during the Gulf War, U.S. troops could not buy needed two-way Motorola 
radios because Motorola did not have an accounting system that met DoD’s procurement 
regulations. In the end, the Japanese government bought the radios from Motorola 
directly and distributed them to American soldiers (Ballenger 1995). 
Globalization has also changed the defense industry. The Department of Defense and 
defense contractors have begun to outsource work and form partnerships with foreign 
defense companies as a way to combine intellectual property, take advantage of 
economies of scale, and reduce costs. Some argue that consolidation of the defense 
industry leaves DoD with fewer options for competitive contracts, making it more 
difficult to ensure performance and cost requirements. Opponents also worry that 
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outsourcing may threaten the military supply chain and put national security at risk by 
relying on foreign companies for defense work. 
As the monopsony buyer (only one buyer seeking products and services of several 
sellers) from an oligopoly set of suppliers (market with so few sellers that actions of any 
one affect price and competitors), it is DoD’s responsibility to consider the structure of 
the industry.  And the structure of that industry will determine the conduct and 
performance of that industry.  If the structure is ignored, two or three wins in a row by 
one supplier may force the other supplier to consolidate or leave the defense industry, 
precluding future competition.  In some of these consolidations, vertical integration is 
taking place.  Another major acquisition issue for the future asks, can DoD assure that the 
prime contractor—transformed from platform suppliers to systems integrators—is 
holding an objective, independent assessment of his own supplier (at both the platform 
level and the lower tier) versus other suppliers.  A major acquisition research challenge is 
to identify ways to assure such objectivity without having DoD assume the responsibility 
for a firm’s make-or-buy decision. 
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Despite recent media and Congressional attention focused on revising business 
standards in the wake of the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, scandals are not limited to 
the private sector. Government acquisition officials feel caught between trying to keep 
projects under budget and on schedule while facing pressure to meet scores of rules and 
requirements mandated by DoD and Congress. The Department’s reputation has been 
damaged by examples of unethical behavior ranging from the “Ill Wind,” bribery and 
corruption scandal of the late 1980’s, to the recent scandal involving former Air Force 
acquisitions chief Darleen Druyun and The Boeing Company. Cases of unethical 
practices involving DoD acquisition personnel demonstrate undesired consequences of 
the current system. Defense acquisition does not operate under free-market rules and 
mutual trust between the government and contractors is largely lacking. In the C-17 case, 
the Program Director purportedly mislead senior acquisition officials and promoted 
continued financial assistance to the Douglas Aircraft Company, despite cost overruns on 
a fixed-price contract, to ensure that the contractor continued progress on the C-17 
airlifter (Heil 1994). 
Strict oversight and investigators may help catch occasional cases of intentional 
wrongdoing, as was the case during the C-17 and “Ill Wind” scandals of the 1980s. 
However, tensions arise when restrictive oversight procedures slow down processes and 
increase costs, leaving acquisition officials frustrated and unsure of how to retain 
innovation and flexibility in a highly bureaucratic system. One estimate calculates that 25 
percent of defense acquisition cost is due to unnecessary oversight, auditing, and 
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regulations (Heil 1994). Extensive oversight and reporting requirements add extra layers 
of bureaucracy and contrast DoD’s desire to increase flexibility in acquisitions. The 
Department must try to find the right balance between empowerment and oversight and 
must ask, “At what point does relying on laws and rules to ensure ethical behavior 
become more costly than the behaviors these rules aim to prevent?”  
Controls
“Buy American” provisions, export controls, and restrictions on skilled foreign 
workers add another layer of external pressures that effect DoD acquisitions.
Buy America.  Congress has passed a number of protectionist measures in an 
effort to keep jobs and industry in the U.S., as well as to promote security by 
having a domestic industrial base.  The Buy American Act of 1933 is perhaps the 
most notable of such controls.  The Act, with a few exceptions, requires that 
federal agencies procure domestically produced, mined, or manufactured articles, 
supplies, and materials for use in the U.S.  Specific to the Department of Defense 
is the Berry Amendment, which compels DoD to purchase certain products—such 
as clothing and other textile items, specialty steel, and food—with 100 percent 
U.S. content and labor.  While current trade agreements have resulted in the 
waiver of many “buy American” provisions, there have been recent legislative 
efforts attempting to close such loopholes.  For example, Representative Duncan 
Hunter, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, introduced language 
to strengthen and expand the Berry and Buy American provisions in the House 
version of the FY 2004 DoD authorization bill.  Such restrictions on what DoD 
can and cannot purchase, and from whom, compound the budgetary pressures 
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already bearing down on the Department and add a significant layer of complexity 
to the program manager’s job.   
Export Controls. DoD is in the difficult position of attempting to strike a balance 
between the defense industry’s push for deregulation with the very real need to 
keep weapons technology out of the hands of terrorists, rogue states, and other 
dangerous individuals and groups.    With the export of goods overseas, or when 
industries merge on an international scale, the technology and intellectual 
property become vulnerable to exploitation.  Export control regulations,3 while 
reasonably effective in controlling technology leaving the U.S., are difficult to 
enforce once the items are manufactured overseas.  However, since U.S. forces 
are increasingly fighting side-by-side with allied forces (in joint coalitions) it is 
critically important that the allies equipment be state-of-the-art and interoperable 
with the equipment of U.S. forces.  Thus, balancing export controls with sharing 
of technology becomes essential for maximum military capability.
Foreign Workers.  As the reliance on hiring skilled foreign workers grows, the 
U.S. Government has increased scrutiny on the access such workers have to 
sensitive information.  This trend is yet another stress that DoD acquisition 
programs must withstand.  Again, this is an area requiring a critical balance, as 
these skilled foreign workers both help to fill a growing shortage of U.S. 
3
The Export Administration Regulation (EAR) administered by the Commerce Department bars the 
export of items, technology, and technical information found on the Commerce Control List to foreign 
countries without appropriate export license. EAR covers the transfer of dual-use commercial goods.  The 
International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) is implemented by the Department of State.  They 
regulate the export of items on the Munitions Control List and technical information about them.  
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engineers and scientist needed in the defense industry, and they often make many 
new and innovative contributions to next-generation U.S. weapon systems. 
Considerable Constant Pressure 
In a tight budget environment and a rapidly changing world, the acquisition area will 
be under increased pressure for improvement.  Weapon systems and services often cost 
too much, take too long, and do not perform as well as planned.  The hierarchical, risk-
adverse, legacy acquisition system will not operate effectively in the new security 
environment. New evolutionary strategies that deliver capability in increments—
incremental and spiral development—have been introduce to accelerate the acquisition 
process.  With these strategies, contracts are written to specify the capabilities needed, 
not end requirements.  This approach calls for extensive collaboration between the 
developer, user, and system tester to maintain a tight feedback loop so that new 
technologies or processes can be incorporated as they emerge.  The process has been 
described as “build a little, test a little, build a little.”(Jackson 2003)
Continuous improvement and user feedback loops are attempts to solve the problems 
of decade-long acquisition cycle times and strict contract requirements with detailed 
systems specifications, which, in the past, have led to final products that are outdated 
before they are ready for mass production. Ultimately, shorter cycle times will reduce 
costs and improve performance by keeping the budget and acquisition cycle time in line 
with the accelerating technological cycles.
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Research Program Objectives
Research that evaluates existing policies, processes, and procedures and makes 
recommendations, then measures their effectiveness, can greatly improve DoD’s 
acquisition program. The objectives of such research are threefold.  First, the purpose is 
to initiate a wide-ranging acquisition research program that leverages both DoD resources 
as well as the broader academic community.  Second, researchers will conduct high-
quality, original research to identify, develop, and evaluate policies, procedures, and 
processes in order to improve DoD acquisitions.  And finally, results will be published 
and presented in a variety of fora to reach, influence, and educate academics, policy 
makers, and acquisition professionals.   
Possible Research Program Governance 
A program management team is needed to promote and oversee further research in 
these areas. Our proposed structure would be to form an “Acquisition Research Steering 
Group” (ARSG), chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, to approve broad research objectives and resources. Members of the ARSG 
would include Service Acquisition Executives, the Director of the Defense Logistics 
Agency, and the Director of Defense Acquisition University. An “External Acquisition 
Experts Advisory Group” would help tap into valuable knowledge and experience outside 
the agencies and Services to provide input for an ongoing research plan and related 
improvement efforts.   
Based on the lead role that the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has taken in an 
effort to develop an external research program, and the fact that they are an academic, 
degree-granting institution used to peer-review processes, we believe they should be 
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appointed as the ARSG’s executive agent. As executive agent NPS would be responsible 
for: (1) developing budgets and a detailed research plan based on the External 
Acquisition Experts Advisory Group’s inputs and consistent with ARSG guidance; (2) 
soliciting, reviewing, and approving proposals using Broad Area Announcements and 
identifying peer reviewers using the NSF model; (3) managing ongoing research; (4) 
identifying appropriate products and distribution channels; and (5) providing ARSG with 
an annual report of activities and proposals for subsequent years. An initial allocation of 
$3 million annually would fund up to two dozen studies per year, which could provide 
high-quality research and recommendations needed for improving performance, reducing 
cycle time, and reducing costs. NPS would also work to publish and present results in a 
variety of channels to reach, influence, and educate academics, policy makers, and 
acquisition professionals.
Research Goals
Figure 6 illustrates a sample research and mission capability feedback loop.  The 
purpose of this research is to leverage DoD resources in conjunction with those of the 
broader academic community to evaluate existing policies, processes, and procedures in 
order to improve acquisition processes overall, and thus enhance warfighting capabilities. 
Current examples of possible research objectives have been categorized into the 
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Figure 6. Research Goals 
The following section discusses each major area and example objectives that target 
one or more of the overarching goals of improving performance, reducing cycle time, and 
reducing costs. A list of valuable research questions related to each of the areas discussed 
below can be found in Exhibit A. 
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Acquisition Processes   
Improved performance relates to more than weapon system capabilities; there is room 
to improve the day-to-day guidelines and rules for acquiring services and components to 
increase speed and flexibility, reduce costs, and improve performance across the board. 
In recent years, performance based logistics, contracting for services rather than systems, 
and e-government initiatives have gained attention as preferred methods for improving 
performance of DoD acquisitions.    
Performance based logistics applied to legacy systems and new contracts are often 
cited as an instrument to improve the acquisition process. Performance based logistics 
(PBL) includes flexible sustainment, but also incorporates direct vendor delivery (DVD), 
technology insertion, reliability-centered maintenance (RCM), process improvement, 
business re-engineering, and public/private partnering and teaming. The basis of PBL is 
establishing logistics performance requirements and contractual incentives to mitigate 
obsolescence and lower the cost of ownership (Naval Aviation Systems TEAM 2001). 
Electronic government programs also offer the opportunity for innovation in the 
acquisition arena. Computers and e-government can be used to link people in remote 
locations and encourage real-time communication, and the expansion of e-government 
offers significant possibilities beyond automating processes to save money.  
Example Objectives: 
Use contract types, past performance, and bundling as methods to 
improve performance.  
Improve impact of e-government initiatives.  
Develop timely metrics and feedback. 
Contract for services rather than systems.  
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Research would also develop timely metrics and feedback in conjunction with these 
and other initiatives to gauge success. Managers often make better decisions when they 
analyze data to give them a clear picture of progress. The ability to spot trends helps 
managers become more responsive to internal and external changes in the acquisition 
environment. Instead of waiting for a project to end to implement lessons learned, 
managers can cut costs and improve performance by making adjustments along the way.  
Project Management 
Expectations of program managers and contracting officials will evolve as the 
acquisition process changes. Clarifying the authority and responsibilities of managers 
will improve performance and likely have the secondary effect of reducing cycle time as 
processes are streamlined. Introducing flexibility and autonomy into the traditional 
procedures will help meet the ever-changing needs of today’s military. A RAND report 
suggests that, “officials must operate in an environment that views an occasional 
unsuccessful project as an acceptable price for building a menu of new projects that can 
be used as a base for rapidly responding to new technological opportunities and new 
operational needs.”(Birkler 2000) Managers with responsibility for an acquisition mission 
area mission should work with those assigned to organize, train, equip, and support the 
mission to generate continuous competition of ideas and methods for constant 
improvement. 
Example Objectives: 
Clarify authority and responsibilities of Program Managers 
and encourage cultural change.
Evaluate resource allocation among multiple goals. 
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System Engineering 
Project managers are responsible for the successful management of people, processes, 
and now technology. The roles of information systems and technology are growing 
within the acquisitions field. Systems Engineering is expected to “provide expert advice 
to help identify and mitigate cost-schedule-performance risks and achieve program 
success” (Lockhart 2004). To assist with systems engineering, the Department instituted 
a systems engineering organization and has begun using Capability Maturity Model 
Integration (CMMI) to set policy for system implementation, training, and education and 
to help capture and institutionalize best practices across DoD. However, this system 
integration is still a work in progress. Rather than stopping improvements upon reaching 
“level X,” work must be done to more fully promote CMMI as a means of continuous 
improvement for all programs (Schaeffer 2004).     
Systems engineering may also be used to help acquisition personnel evaluate 
contractors’ cost and schedule estimates. Public sector adoption of commercial practices 
and products are promoted as ways to build on existing knowledge to cut costs and 
reduce cycle time. But, this increasing reliance on commercial systems and contractors 
does not come without risks. Periodic evaluations of contractor performance must be 
conducted to help keep projects on schedule and may enable parties to catch problems 
early or adjust expectations. Interoperability of systems (hardware, software, 
Example Objectives: 
Evaluate contractors and incorporation of commercial practices. 
Ensure interoperability of hardware, software, organizations, and 
human capital.  
Meet joint requirements.   
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organizations, and human capital), combined with contractor oversight and the 
integration of commercial practices, are essential components of meeting the joint 
requirements set by the Department of Defense.    
Logistics
As requirements for the acquisition of equipment and services change, so too should 
the logistics systems that deliver these goods to end-users. Joint Vision 2020 suggests a 
transformation path from the current system to focused logistics, defined as “the ability to 
provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at 
the right time, and in the right quantity, across the full range of military operations” 
(CJCS 2000).
This advanced logistics system will incorporate automated identification technologies 
to provide accurate counts and location information on assets as well as technology to 
provide real-time data to link multiple Service and support agencies. A seamless logistics 
pipelines improves operational effectiveness and efficiency while simultaneously 
reducing sustainment requirements and vulnerability to breaks in communication. Such 
shifts also make the acquisition processes a more intricate part of the logistics supply 
chain and require speed, efficiency, and precision. Additional research should be 
conducted that suggests ways to overcome internal resistance to incorporating these 
modern logistics practices.
Example Objectives: 
Transform logistics to better support the expeditionary 
forces.
Overcome internal resistance to introducing and 
incorporating modern logistics practices.
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Human Capital 
Lasting transformation is impossible without meaningful acceptance from personnel 
at all levels. When leaders emphasize injecting innovative practices into the acquisitions 
and contracting arenas, they must be prepared to answer questions about what this means 
in terms of individual performance and job functions. As the acquisition process becomes 
more complex, the skills needed to perform these tasks also change. For example, 
evaluating best-value acquisitions is more complicated and demanding than fixed-price 
contracts (Looke 2003). Employees are increasingly expected to consider technological 
capabilities, performance history, and service agreements in addition to quoted prices 
when evaluating contracts. Thus, research aimed at identifying the skills to manage future 
acquisitions successfully is needed.  
In general, people tend to shy away from tasks that could end in failure, and this 
makes it more difficult for leaders to encourage cultural change. In the federal 
government, incentives reinforce a low-risk culture and don’t generally reward 
innovations, especially in government processes.  Therefore, leaders must work to foster 
environments conducive to reform. Many acquisition professionals are keenly aware of 
the pressures and problems and if given the flexibility and encouragement to examine 
solutions more creatively, could provide some important advancements.  Education and 
training programs can also help smooth the transition for many employees by, first, 
Example Objectives: 
Identify skills to manage future acquisitions successfully. 
Determine needs for education and training. 
Designate desired features of recruitment practices. 
Consider ethics and the impacts of oversight.
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exposing them to new techniques used in the commercial sector and other innovative 
practices in acquisitions and, second, giving them an opportunity to learn techniques and 
approaches to integrate these practices into their existing systems and procedures. 
Managers also need to consider the changing acquisition profession and look at updating 
systems of recruitment, hiring, rewards, and evaluation to realign them with the new 
behaviors and practices required in the new environment. 
Industrial Base 
Falling expenditures for defense systems combined with an increasingly competitive 
and global marketplace have spurred significant consolidation in the defense industry. 
Defense companies have undergone mergers and acquisitions with former competitors in 
an effort to take advantage of economies of scale while reducing overhead and inventory 
costs. This is an area of great importance because as the number of contractors decrease, 
DoD has fewer options for competitive contracts and it becomes more difficult to ensure 
performance and costs requirements when no close substitutes exist. This consolidation 
may also impact the objectivity of prime contractors when choosing sub-contractors.
Thus, research should investigate the impact of consolidation in pricing and objectivity.   
In a progressively globalizing world, DoD has increasingly begun to consider 
outsourcing defense work abroad as a new way to promote competition and lower costs. 
Outsourcing enables DoD to acquire competitive goods from foreign companies at a 
Example Objectives: 
Investigate impact of industry consolidation and 
civilian/military integration in pricing and objectivity. 
Examine effects of globalization on acquisitions and 
relationships with allies.   
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reduced cost and simultaneously encourages improvements in price and products from 
domestic producers. Despite the benefits of cost savings and improved performance, 
some experts worry that outsourcing may be too great a risk. The Department of Defense 
has less control over the supply chain when it must coordinate multiple producers in 
disperse geographic locations. For example, foreign governments could influence local 
suppliers and restrict trade with the United States as retaliation for U.S. foreign policy 
stances. The Department of Defense must evaluate these risks and find ways to secure 
reliable production and distribution when awarding contracts to foreign suppliers.
Market-based Sourcing 
Market-based or competitive sourcing was designated a major initiative under the 
2001 Presidential Management Agenda. DoD has the largest program of market-based 
sourcing and the Department projects savings of over $6 billion from A-76 competitions 
completed between 2000 and 2003 (OMB 2003). Contrary to political rhetoric, recent 
data show that most claims of the negative impact of competitive sourcing on federal 
employees are unfounded. Of the 65,157 civilian positions “studied” (i.e. competitively 
sourced) since 1995, only 5 percent were reduced through involuntary separation; even 
though the savings averaged over 30% (Gansler 2004).
The Defense Department’s ability to utilize market-based sourcing, to maintain high-
quality operations and competitive pressure, will lead to improved performance and 
Example Objectives: 
Evaluate use of market-based sourcing to support military 
operations and maintain competitive pressure.  
Use incentives to overcoming internal resistance to change.  
Establish best practices, targets, and goals.
39
reduced cycle time, in addition to reduced costs. Despite evidence that competitive 
sourcing aids the Department in meeting its goals, additional research is needed to 
establish best practices to increase the effectiveness of this sourcing strategy.  
Spiral Development 
The Department of Defense has begun emphasizing incremental and spiral 
development, along with more flexible contracts in an effort to shorten acquisition cycle 
times. Spiral, or evolutionary, development allows for high-level capabilities faster and at 
lower cost by producing and deploying systems based on mature technologies. These 
practices are especially beneficial for software intensive weapons programs. DoD 
estimated that it spends about 40 percent of its Research, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation budget on software—$21 billion for fiscal year 2003. Of this, 40 percent, or 
$8 billion, was spent to rework software because of quality-related issues (GAO 2004a). 
Catching problems early can shorten cycle time, reduce costs, and ultimately improve 
performance of the development processes and the end products. Organizations that work 
in an evolutionary environment, follow disciplined development processes, collect and 
analyze meaningful metrics to measure progress, and are better equipped to improve their 
software development processes on a continuous basis.  
Utilizing these strategies and writing contracts specifying the capabilities needed 
overtime—not just desired end results—can help program officers maintain a tight 
Example Objectives: 
Analyze use of incremental development in private sector.  
Use spiral development to improve the budget process, the 
Test & Evaluation process, and the logistics process.
Lower risks, reduce cycle time, and cut costs.   
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feedback loop with contractors and allow both parties to design the solution piece by 
piece, making improvements as new technologies and processes become available. 
Incremental development attempts to solve the problems of decade-long cycle times and 
strict contracts mandating certain inputs, which, in the past, have led to final products that 
are outdated before being ready for mass production.
Use of Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products are designed to be easily installed and 
interoperable with existing system components. Besides interoperability, two major 
advantages of COTS products are their availability and relatively low cost, which serve to 
reduce cycle time and expenses. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 
1994 and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996 emphasized the use of 
commercial procurement but there is still room for improvement, especially in the area of 
software acquisitions. As of July 2004, GAO found that DoD's information technology 
(IT) business system acquisition policies and guidance fully incorporate 8 of the 18 best 
practices, partially incorporate 5 practices, and do not incorporate the remaining 5 
practices, particularly those associated with acquiring commercial component-based 
business systems (GAO 2004b). The report argues that the DoD 5000 (acquisition) series 
policies do not provided effective controls for ensuring that best practices are 
Example Objectives: 
Assess role of prior acquisition reforms in promoting 
commercial procurement.  
Ensure acceptable environmental performance of COTS 
equipment. 
Improve methods of measurement and oversight.   
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appropriately followed. Research into methods of measurement and oversight could help 
promote increased acceptance and use of commercial products throughout the DoD.  
Lifecycle
According to VADM (Ret.) Arthur Cebrowski, Director of the U.S. Office of Force 
Transformation, “If program managers want their program to survive, they must solve 
and resolve the riddle of why commercial cycle times are measured in weeks, months or 
just a few years, while DoD’s cycle time is measured in decades” (Giffard 2002).
Industry Past Current Goal 
Defense 132 months 102 months < 66 months 
Automobile 84 months 24 months < 18 months 
Commercial 
Aircraft
96 – 120 months 70 months 30 months 
Commercial 
Spacecraft
96 months 18 months 12 months 
Consumer 
Electronics
24 months 6 months < 6 months 
Figure 7. Comparison of Cycle Time Benchmarks  
SOURCE: (Giffard 2002) 
Despite recent changes to policy, including passage of FASA and FARA, there is no 
systematic approach to measure the acquisition cycle time. Neither deployment nor 
production cycle time is systematically considered and DoD cannot focus solely on the 
development cycle time without consideration of the front or back end (Vollmecke 2004). 
Further research is needed to determine more accurate methods of calculating total life 
Example Objectives: 
Accelerate the concept through deployment cycle 
Measure total life cycle costs.
Develop economic models to guide contractor incentives. 
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cycle times and costs that accurately reflect the expectations of the Office of Force 
Transformation and the needs of today’s soldiers.  Today, there is extremely poor 
visibility into the direct and indirect costs associated with the operations and support of 
individual weapon systems—yet the totals for these costs have been rising rapidly.
Acquisition personnel would also benefit from economic models that guide contract 
incentives in an effort to reduce cycle time and costs even in a market dominated by a 
limited number of firms.      
Cost and Schedule Estimation
The majority of these broad trends are intertwined with other trends and are closely 
related to cycle time and costs as well. Improving the quality and accuracy of estimates 
for various metrics across subject areas will help DoD employees gain a more complete 
understanding of the situations they face during this time of transformation. In some 
cases, this may mean making tradeoffs between costs and scheduling. Can dollar amounts 
be attached to contract delays or is there a way to rank the relative importance of meeting 
schedule estimates as compared to meeting cost estimates? Are there projects where one 
target goal is more important than another? Accurate measurements of cycle time and 
costs help the acquisition workforce make better decisions. Over time, metrics should be 
institutionalized and used to evaluate future contracts and improve efficiency across the 
board.
Example Objectives: 
Improve quality and accuracy of estimates.  
Evaluate tradeoffs between cost and scheduling. 
Develop metrics for use in future contracts.  
43
Conclusion
The goal of researching and suggesting improvements to the acquisition process is to 
strengthen public confidence in the Defense Department and its ability to provide 
protection for taxpayers, and to realize, more rapidly, the high potential for improvements 
in performance, reduction in cycle time, and reduction in costs. Change is often resisted 
out of fear of the unknown. However, if DoD does not make substantial changes to 
respond to budgetary pressures and other external drivers, the department will find it 
increasingly difficult to modernize and transform its forces to face changing global 
threats. Expanding commercial acquisitions, utilizing models of continuous 
improvement, exploring the possibilities for interoperability, adjusting human capital 
practices, and ensuring a strong industrial base are just a few areas that will position the 
Department of Defense to meet the new challenges of the 21st century while using 
resources more efficiently. Linking with non-traditional partners, such as educational 
institutions, could also help DoD connect acquisition professionals with outside 
researchers or perhaps match practical problems with outside sources able to provide 
insight or solutions. These small investments in acquisition research have the potential to 
yield significant benefits and help acquisition officials overcome the challenges they can 
expect to face in the future.  Moreover, a 10 percent improvement in the acquisition 
process (resulting from only, say, a $3 million per year investment in acquisition 
research) can free up approximately $25 billion per year (from an annual research and 
development, procurement, and support budget of over $250 billion) while improving 
military capability.  How can we afford not to do it?   
44
Reference List 
 1.  Ballenger, Wesley A. Jr. 1995. "Acquisition Reform: Where We've Been; Current Legislation and 
Initiatives; and Where We're Going." The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National 
Defense University. 
 2.  Birkler, John Giles Smith Glenn Kent and Robert Johnson. 2000. An Acquisition Strategy, Process, 
and Organization for Innovative Systems. RAND publications. 
 3.  Cebrowski, Arthur, Director, Force Transformation. "Top Five Goals of the Director, Force 
Transformation." Web page, [accessed 9 November 2004]. Available at 
http://www.oft.osd.mil/top_five_goals.cfm. 
 4.  CJCS. Joint Vision 2020. June 2000 
 5.  Cooper, Michael Andrew. Department of Defense Implementation of Acquisition Reform Initiatives.  
 6.  DoD. 2001. Network Centric Warfare Report to Congress (2001).  
 7.  DoD. 2003. Transformation Planning Guidance.  
 8.  Gansler, Jacques S. 2002 A Vision of the Government as a World-Class Buyer: Major Procurement 
Issues for the Coming Decade The Pricewaterhouse Coopers Endowment for The Business 
of Government. 
 9.  Gansler, Jacques S. and William Lucyshyn. 2004. Competitive Sourcing: What Happens to Federal 
Employees?  
 10.  GAO. 2004a. Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to Improve DOD's Software Intensive 
Weapon Acquisitions.  
 11.  ———. 2004b. Information Technology: DOD's Acquisition Policies and Guidance Need to 
Incorporate Additional Best Practices and Controls.  
 12.  Giffard, Bernard F. 2002. Shortening the Defense Acquisition Cycle: A Transformational 
Imperative.  1, 3.  
 13.  Grasso, Valerie Bailey. 2002. Defense Acquisition Reform: Status and Current Issues. Congressional 
Research Service; The Library of Congress. 
 14.  Heil, Michael. 1994. "Ethics in an Acquisition Environment: C-17 Case Study." The Industrial 
College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. 
 15.  Jackson, Joab. 2003. "Pentagon backs spiral development." Web page, [accessed 2 May 2005]. 
Available at http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/18_5/cover-stories/20872-
1.html. 
 16.  Jacoby, Lowell E. 2004. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States. 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 
 17.  Linster, Bruce G. Lt Col Stephen Slate and Robert L. Waller. 2002. Consolidation of the U.S. 
Defense Industrial Base: Impact on Research Expenditures.  Acquisition Review Quarterly:
143-50. 
45
 18.  Lockhart, Richard L. 2004. Systems Engineering Revitalization. TEST WEEK 2004 presentation. 
 19.  Looke, Randall F. 2003. Injecting Commercial and Innovative Practices into Operational 
Contracting. Air Force Journal of Logistics XXVII , no. 4: 14-21 . 
 20.  National Defense Staff. 1999. Pentagon Moves to Price-Based Procurement to Attract Vendors. 
Arlington, Virginia: Lawrence P. Farrell, Jr. . 
 21.  Naval Aviation Systems TEAM. 2001. Performance Based Logistics Overview. National Defense 
Industrial Association.
 22.  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (PR). "Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan." Web 
page, [accessed 14 October 2004]. Available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/docs/civilian_hr_stratplan2_403.pdf. 
 23.  OMB. 2003. Competitive Sourcing: Conducting Public-Private Competition in a Reasoned and 
Responsible Manner.  
 24.  OMB. 2004. " Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005." Web page, [accessed 4 
November 2004]. Available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/defense.html. 
 25.  Pringle, Peter. 8 February 1989. Stink of scandal in the Pentagon jungle: As Congress considers the 
appointment of a new Defense Secretary, Peter Pringle reports on corruption among the 
weapons dealers. The Independent, sec. Letters, p. 21. 
 26.  Reeves, Stephen V. 1996. "The Ghosts of Acquisition Reform: Past, Present and Future." The 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. 
 27.  Report of the Committee on Appropriations.  Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2005 
 28.  Schaeffer, Mark. 2004. DoD Systems Engineering and CMMI.  
 29.  Tenet, George J., Director of Central Intelligence. 2004. The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in 
a Changing Global Context. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 
 30.  Vollmecke, Kirk. 2004. Shortening the Defense Acquisition Cycle: A Transformational Imperative.  
p. 8. U.S. Army War College. 
 31.  Walker, David M., Comptroller General of the United States. 2003. Human Capital: DOD's Civilian 
Personnel Strategic Management and the Proposed National Security Personnel System. 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 
Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia. 
 32.  ———. 2005. Transformation Challenges. Defense Business Transformation Forum. 
46
Appendix A — Example Research Questions 
I. Improve Performance 
Acquisition Processes 
o Requirements  
What major differences exist between writing requirements for DoD 
acquisition contracts and private sector best practices?  
What potential barriers exist to simplifying the process?   
o Contract Types 
How effective are the different contract types at producing 
performance that exceeds project goals?  
How do contract types differ in promoting improved performance, 
lowering costs, and encouraging faster cycle times?   
Are performance-based contracts more effective in acquiring services?  
How does DoD define performance?  How should it?
Is past performance an effective predictor of future performance?  
What role should past performance play when granting extensions or 
new contracts?
How does bundling of contracts impact small and disadvantaged 
business?
What are the benefits of bundling? What can be done to prevent the 
disadvantages?
o Maintaining the potential for competition after product or service awards 
How can an acquisition strategy be implemented that maintains the 
potential for future competition (without the requirement to do so)?   




How has the implementation of e-government initiatives impacted 
acquisition performance?  What has been the impact to performance 
and costs? 
How can e-government initiatives be used to catalyze the 
reengineering of acquisition processes?  
o Metrics and Feedback 
Which metrics should be emphasized to better align DoD acquisition 
goals with long term strategic goals?  How should these metrics be 
analyzed?     
Honest and timely feedback is a critical component of continuous 
improvement. What practices encourage productive feedback at all 
levels of the acquisition process?   
What non-financial performance criteria should be monitored?  How 
should these be balanced?       
o Contracting for services rather than systems – surge requirements 
What are the greatest challenges to awarding performance-based 
service contracts?  How should these be addressed? 
A study by RAND found three key areas related to performance-based 
services acquisition (PBSA): teamwork, market research, and using 
past performance information. Do these key areas lead to 
improvements in PBSA?  How are these principles practiced in the 
acquisition process?  
What are the most effective approaches to anticipate and satisfy 
services surge requirements? 
o To what degree should the acquisition process be involved with what is 
developed and bought as opposed to just how it is done?  
o Congress, as well as the DoD, has initiated many acquisition reforms.  How 
effective have the recent efforts been? Have they achieved their objectives?  
What can be learned from these efforts to make future reforms more effective?  
For example, has Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
FY 2003 (requiring a documented process for software acquisition planning, 
requirements development, project management, etc.) improved DoD’s 
software acquisition process? 
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o What benefits and concerns do the following issues hold for the government 
when using a Lead Systems Integrator (LSI): maintaining competition; 
vertical integration; and the government’s role?    
Program Management 
o Organizational Issues 
What should be the authority and responsibilities of a Life Cycle 
Program Manager?  How should horizontal management be 
maintained?   
Do barriers exist that preclude the Life Cycle Program Manager from 
exerting authority and responsibility? What must change to enable 
those authorities and responsibilities?  
How should DoD’s leadership encourage cultural change in the 
Department of Defense? Will these roles be different for political 
appointees, military, and civilian employees?    
How will the use of networked organizations (within government 
organizations and between government and industry) affect DoD’s 
acquisition processes?    
o Resource Allocation
What factors should be considered when prioritizing the equally 
important goals of improving/maintaining current weapons systems 
and developing new systems that support force transformation?   
How are competing resource allocation priorities evaluated in relation 
to each other?   
Systems Engineering 
o How can DoD incentivize industry to adopt and implement sound life cycle 
system engineering practices? 
o Should systems integration contractors be explicitly evaluated on their ability 
to implement commercial subsystems and components?  What factors should 
be included in the evaluations?  
o Should systems integration contractors be independent of hardware suppliers?   
49
o How can acquisition plans prepare users for the impact that business processes 
that are embedded in the commercial components will have on their respective 
roles and responsibilities (e.g., warranties)? 
o Would including the status of identified risks in acquisition reviews improve 
cost, schedule, and performance results? 
o Integration to support transformation 
What are the most effective ways to integrate DoD’s envisioned 
system of systems?   
What are the most effective ways to test these systems? 
o Interoperability 
As DoD moves toward a more network-centric force, what roles do 
hardware, software, organization, and human capital play in 
developing interoperability within the joint forces?  
What steps (e.g., individual incentives) should be taken during the 
acquisition process to increase compatibility and interoperability?  
o Cyber and Network Security
Cyber-security remains an important issue; what actions should be 
taken to ensure secure network/communications among forces 
(including joint and coalition)?  
o Joint requirements 
How effectively does the current system respond to joint 
requirements?  How can it be improved? 
How have technological, organizational, and conceptual innovations 
transformed the military?  Civilian teams?  What lessons are most 
useful to future DoD projects? 
o Test and Evaluation (T&E) 
How can the focus of T&E be shifted from a final exam to an integral 
part of the development process, yet still maintain objectivity and 
independence?  
How should T&E be performed on a system of systems? 
How should T&E be performed on special developments? 
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Logistics
o How can DoD establish high reliability as an enforceable design requirement?  
What is DoD’s recent history with reliability as a key performance parameter 
(KPP)? 
o How should logistics support be transformed to better support the 
expeditionary forces?  The concept of net-centric warfare? 
o What technological gaps must be filled to achieve a joint end-to-end logistical 
process?  Potential gaps may include: communication systems to connect the 
entire logistics force; ID tags to enable “in-transit” visibility of supplies; and 
the development of data standards so that a “single real-time logistics database 
can support all services and coalition allies in a secure environment.” 
o How can the Department overcome internal resistance to introducing modern 
logistics practices? 
Human Capital Issues 
o Required Skills 
What combinations of skills (i.e., contracting expertise, project 
management experience, IT knowledge, etc) will be necessary to 
successfully manage future acquisitions?   
Are current recruitment practices attracting and retaining employees 
with skills in alignment with the Department’s strategy?  How should 
they be modified? 
How much do acquisition professionals need to know about the 
technology, capabilities, and operational environment of a system in 
order to develop effective acquisition strategies, plans, and processes?  
In which respects are the competencies required to be a successful 
program manager the same for government and civilian projects?  
o Education and training 
What acquisition skills, education, and training would best support the 
program manager in the future?   
Do benefits from continuing education and training courses outweigh 
the costs?  
How can acquisition research and education (including continuing 
education programs) be more closely integrated? 
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o Recruitment 
What recruitment practices should DoD employ? Would private sector 
hiring and/or employee training practices benefit DoD?  What features 
should be included in future practices? 
In the face of budget constraints and increased security concerns, what 
strategies should DoD use to effectively address the current human 
capital requirements?  
o Ethics considerations 
How much oversight is required to maintain a highly ethical 
workforce? What methods of oversight are currently being practiced?  
Are they a necessary and efficient use of resources?   
What is the impact associated with current DoD oversight and auditing 
designed to protect against unethical dealings in the acquisition 
process?   
How effective have previous legislative actions been in curbing ethical 
lapses?  
How should special issues regarding civilians—government 
employees and civilian contractors—on the battlefield be addressed?  
These issues may include experience, security, and military 
responsibility.
Industrial Base 
o Industry Consolidation 
How should programs be structured so that markets effectively 
determine prices when there are only a few large suppliers (e.g., 
oligopoly) and only one buyer (e.g., monopsony)? 
Should the DoD take any steps to ensure the survival of any of the 
remaining prime contractors?  What about critical subcontractors?  
With all of the vertical consolidation, are prime contractors making 
objective decisions when selecting sub-contractors?  Are any changes 
required to ensure objectivity? 
o Civilian/Military Industrial Integration 
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How does civilian/military industrial integration impact costs? What 
are the cost and risk impacts? 
Should civilian/military integration be encouraged; and, if so, how? 
o Globalization 
What impacts has globalization had on DoD acquisition? 
What issues are associated with outsourcing DoD work abroad? 
What should DoD do to assure supply of critical technologies and 
products in the face of globalization? 
To what extent could (and should) defense acquisition procurements of 
equipment and processes from foreign countries be adapted for use in 
the US; and, if so, how? 
To what extent do future military successes depend upon cooperation 
and coordination with allied nations?
How should export control rules and procedures be utilized to take 
advantage of benefits of cooperation while reducing risks?    
Market-based Sourcing 
o What is the impact of using market-based sourcing to support military 
operations? 
Can contractors effectively meet surge requirements? 
What steps should be taken to maintain competitive pressure?  
o How does market-based sourcing affect performance and cost?  
o What incentives can be utilized to overcome barriers to market-based 
sourcing, including internal resistance to change, political pressures, and 
reporting requirements?
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II. Reduce Cycle Time 
Acquisition Processes 
o What does speed represent for acquisition projects?  Is it a dependent variable 
resulting from other parameters or can it be managed independently?  
o How should the impact of cycle time reduction be evaluated with respect to 
other project aspects such as cost and performance?
o What impact have Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) 
programs had on accelerating the weapon system development process?  What 
are the most effective components of ACTD?   
o Contract Type 
How effective are contract incentives at producing performance that 
results in reduced cycle time?
Should past performance on cycle time be evaluated when granting 
extensions or new contracts?  Which metrics should be used in these 
evaluations?  
Spiral and Evolutionary Development 
o How do spiral and evolutionary developments differ? 
o How much does spiral development effectively reduce cycle time? Is it the 
same for evolutionary development?  
o How is continuous improvement, or incremental development, used 
effectively in the private sector?
o What private sector practices should be adopted by DoD to enhance spiral 
development?   
o When is spiral development advantageous?  When is evolutionary 
development advantageous?  
What is the impact of spiral development on the budget process, the 
requirements process, the Testing &Evaluation process, and the 
logistics process? 
How should the requirements, budget, and T&E processes be changed 
to encourage spiral development?   
What is the impact of spiral development on program management?   
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o How does time spent gathering data, examining options, and planning at the 
early stages impact cost and schedule?   
Do results show that spiral development lowers risks, reduces cycle 
time to development, and cuts costs?   
Use of COTS
o The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and the Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996 emphasized the use of commercial 
procurement to lower costs and reduce cycle time.  How have these reforms 
affected the use of COTS? Has the use of COTS improved schedule 
performance?  
o What metrics should be used when evaluating the effectiveness of COTS? 
o What steps should be taken to increase the use of COTS in future acquisition? 
o Is there a link between cycle time and changes in the number and size of 
suppliers to DoD? 
o What are the benefits of increased use of COTS?  What are the implications 
for weapon design?  What are the costs and risks? 
o Advocates of increased Civil-Military Integration (CMI) believe that 
acquiring goods commercially will shorten development times, improve 
reliability and maintainability, and result in cost savings. Have recent CMI 
projects realized projected cost savings and improved reliability? How are 
these initiatives being implemented?  
o What testing is required to assure high-quality, acceptable environmental 
performance of COTS equipment?   
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III. Reduce Cost 
Lifecycle Logistics 
o How should life cycle costs be effectively measured and evaluated?  
o What is the impact of various perturbations in development on life cycle total 
ownership costs?   
o What economic models are available to guide contract incentivization and 
reduce costs? 
Market-Based Sourcing (e.g., competitive sourcing, outsourcing, public-
private partnerships, privatization) 
o Market-based sourcing of non-inherently-governmental work 
What are the performance and cost impacts when using market-based 
sourcing? 
What are the best practices to follow? 
Which sourcing strategies result in greater savings?  
When using competitive sourcing, should target goals for the number 
and size of competitions be established? 
Cost and Schedule Estimation 
o What steps can be taken to improve the quality of cost estimates? 
o What techniques are available to increase accountability of life cycle 
management?  Have DoD’s efforts been effective in this regard?  
o How should tradeoffs between cost and scheduling be measured? Explain 
instances in which each metric holds the advantage.  
o Can the value of cost and schedule metrics be generalized into knowledge 
useful for future contracts?   
o Measuring government costs 
Evaluate the use of activity-based costing as a management tool for 
controlling and reducing government indirect costs.  
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